Should Christians Confess Their Sins? Part 2

As I described in Part 1, I have noted five basic objections to the idea that John’s first epistle is about justification, and if these objections can be defeated, then it becomes reasonable to say that 1 John 1:9 could pertain to justification. The second objection I will deal with is that the book of 1 John is about "fellowship," not salvation. Therefore, so the argument goes, 1 John 1:9 cannot pertain to salvation or justification.

This is a noble objection because it aims to squash a very popular view of 1 John, where various verses are seen as “tests” of whether a person is actually saved. This “Tests of Life” model is deeply flawed and completely indefensible. I’ve heard Lordship teachers say that 1 John is about “assurance of salvation,” but it’s not difficult to see why this doesn’t work: If you have to “test” whether you’re saved or not, you quite obviously have no assurance. The entire approach is an exercise in futility. And since the criteria for proving you “have life” are so subjective and poorly defined, the tests can’t ever be counted on to produce a reliable result.

Free Grace teachers generally advocate the “Tests of Fellowship” model in opposition to “Tests of Life” as if it doesn’t suffer similar problems. You see, to say that the test is for “fellowship” instead of “life” doesn’t get around the fact that the criteria are subjective and poorly defined. Such tests cannot give you reliable results. Given God’s character, it’s difficult to imagine how God could give us tests that are unreliable.

John says in 1:4 that his purpose for writing is “that your joy may be full.” But when you consider the flaws of either “test” model, it becomes clear that if these “tests” are taken seriously, no one’s going to come out of it with any “joy.” They’re going to see that, well, they don’t keep His commandments, and so they must not have life. Or they must not have fellowship. Neither is good. How are such tests compatible even with the very first purpose statement of the letter?

To deal with this objection, we have to explore this idea of “fellowship.” I need to be sure that I understand what the term means. Unfortunately, John only uses the word “koinonia” 3 times, and all of those are in 1 John. So if we were to limit our word study to John’s writings, that’s all we have to go by.

In 2 Corinthians 6:14, however, we get a clear idea of the word’s meaning when Paul writes:

“Do not be unequally yoked together with unbelievers.”

Paul is concerned about being “unequally yoked together” with unbelievers. The metaphor relates to oxen pulling a cart, engaged in a common cause. The oxen are “yoked together,” a picture of “joint participation.” Notice how broad this is. And the two rhetorical questions which follow add some emphasis. In English, (NKJV) we can see there are two different words here that correspond to being “yoked together.”

“For what fellowship has righteousness with lawlessness? And what communion has light with darkness?”

In the first question, the word “fellowship” is “metoche,” and then the word “communion” in the second question is the Greek word “koinonia.” When you compare the English translations, it’s clear that the two words are synonymous, meaning “fellowship, association, community, communion, joint participation.”

Accordingly, I take “fellowship” to be a very broad term which simply means “joint participation.” It refers to two or more individuals being united in a plan, like two oxen pulling a cart. The question to ask here is: “Is ‘koinonia’ a word that can be used to describe our permanent identification with Christ, and our association with God through faith in Christ?” It seems that it’s used that way in 1 Corinthians 1:9 and Philippians 1:5, so the answer must be “Yes.” But does that mean it’s used that way in 1 John? Not necessarily, but the fellowship mentioned in 1 John is fellowship with God, so we’re already in the ballpark. I am convinced that “fellowship” in 1 John 1 does refer to our permanent, unbreakable union with God through faith in Christ and that 1 John 1:9 describes how that fellowship is established.

John’s Purpose:

So if both “Test” models are flawed, what is the point of John’s letter? Well… John tells us in plain terms. Purpose statements are found in 1:4, 2:1, 2:12, and 5:13. Considered as a whole, these purpose statements fit neatly under a larger umbrella. John wants to assure people that they really do have eternal life. It’s clear that John’s audience had been exposed to some false teachers and this apparently left a mark. These believers had evidently come under attack by deceivers who were trying to undermine their confidence in the truth they had already believed. The emphasis the text places on personal sins in John’s letter suggests that false teachers may have capitalized on the personal failures of the members. John wants to reassure these people again. And how better to do that than to re-iterate those basic truths of salvation, truths that the audience had heard and believed previously, but had been brought into question? In 5:13 John wants them to know that they have eternal life. In 2:12 He says that their sins have been forgiven (perfect tense). In 2:1-2 John reminds them that Christ’s advocacy on their behalf is the solution to their sin. All of this adds up to making complete the joy of John’s audience in 1:4.

The objection is that 1 John is about “fellowship,” not “salvation,” as if they are two different things. When we trust in Christ, we become “yoked together” with God, and we cannot become “un-yoked.” This, I’m convinced, is what John had in mind with the word “koinonia.”

Should Christians Confess Their Sins? Part 1

Years ago I began to notice a fundamental discrepancy in certain aspects of Free Grace teaching. This discrepancy was not one that would endear me to Lordship Salvation… rather, it made me question whether some aspects of what I’ll call “standard” Free Grace teaching might be, well, a bit less than “Free Grace.”

I began to notice what appeared to be a certain amount of “doublespeak” when it came to the question of whether our sins are forgiven. I noticed that passages like Psalm 103:12, Job 14:17, Micah 7:19 and Hebrews 8:12 seem to emphasize the totality of forgiveness, while the teaching regarding 1 John 1:9 seemed to diminish that totality with the suggestion that when a believer sins, there is a sense in which he is not forgiven until and unless he acknowledges that sin to God, and that until he does that, he is “out-of-fellowship” and his prayers will not be heard. This is a view that I will refer to as "Frangible Fellowship." The word "frangible" essentially means "able to be broken." And something that can be broken needs to be repaired. On the Frangible Fellowship view, naming individual sins to God is the repair.

Frangible Fellowship teaches that the barrier between myself and God was removed, even permanently, by my faith in Christ, but that a new barrier—an interruption in my fellowship with God—could pop up again, brought about by sin, which was supposedly sealed up in a bag, hurled into the depths of the sea and removed as far from me as the East is from the West.

To be fair, I could follow the reasoning. It did appear that 1 John 1:9 was prescribing an action for the audience to whom he was writing. And although “forgive us our sins” and “cleanse us from all unrighteousness” sounded a lot like justification, I could understand why the teachers I was listening to were insisting otherwise. These were, after all, believers who had already been justified. So why would John prescribe for his audience an action which would result in what they already had? And if John wanted to tell anyone how to become justified, why wouldn’t he mention anything about faith in Christ? And why does John use present-tense verbs which seem to imply action that continues on to some extent?

I don’t mind admitting that questions like these looked daunting to me at first. But at the same time, I just couldn’t ignore certain features of the text, and so I was driven to look for answers to those questions. And it turns out that those questions do have very reasonable answers which are quite compatible with an emphasis on faith alone in Christ alone plus nothing.

In this article, I will argue that 1 John 1:9 does pertain to justification. I will present five basic objections people have to understanding it that way, and I will offer defeaters for each of those objections. I will then offer scriptural support for the understanding I’m advocating, and I will propose a reasonable context for the letter and show how this understanding fits that context, and I will offer additional reasons why I think 1 John should be understood this way and why I think the traditional understanding is in error.

I want to say that I have been deeply influenced—in a good way, I think—by various pastors whom I trust, but who hold the view of 1 John which I am critiquing. I mean no disrespect to any of them, nor to any other pastor who teaches Frangible Fellowship. I was taught the doctrine from an early age and believed it and practiced it for decades. When I began to realize that things didn’t appear to add up, I decided to strike out on my own, and it seems to me to have been worth the effort.

Objections to Overcome:

I have noted five basic objections to the idea that John’s first epistle is about justification:

1) Collective pronouns refer to John + readers
2) 1 John is about “fellowship,” not salvation
3) Use of Present-Tense Verbs
4) 1 John 1:9 misstates the gospel
5) The conditional statements in 1 John 1:6-10 are prescriptive

If these objections can be defeated, then it becomes reasonable to say that this passage could pertain to justification. If there remains no reason to avoid that conclusion, then we can go forward with exploring how that might work. In this first entry, I will address the first of the five objections.

Objection 1: Collective Pronouns

Misidentifying the antecedent for the collective pronouns in 1 John 1:6-10 is, I’m convinced, the biggest barrier to understanding John’s intent in this passage. The common reading is that “we,” “us” and “our” in these verses refer to John plus the people whom he’s addressing. And there’s no doubt in my mind that John is addressing people who have previously trusted in Christ and who do have eternal life. However, there’s nothing in the grammar here that actually tells us—in an objective way—what the correct antecedent is. This is an interpretive question that will be answered by contextual cues.  But what is the context? Certainly, part of the context is that John is addressing believers. But what problem do these believers face? Well, John seems to be interested in reassuring these people about their salvation. All four of the purpose statements found in the letter are consistent with this basic idea, and throughout the letter there are numerous references to believing that Jesus is the Christ as opposed to denying the same. This culminates in 1 John 5:13, at which point John explains that he’s written the letter so that his audience will know that they have eternal life. Does this not imply that the audience has been doubting it? So let’s look at that as a sort of “hypothesis” for the context and see if that leads us in any interesting directions.

Back to the issue of identifying the antecedent: When a writer uses a collective pronoun such as “we” or “us” or “our,” the writer is referring to a group of individuals that includes the writer himself. Whatever the antecedent, it needs to be a group of people that includes, at minimum, John himself. Since John is a believer and since the members of his audience are believers, it’s not unreasonable to think that perhaps “believers” is the group to whom “we” refers. But it’s not the only option.

The human race is also a group which includes John himself, and also encompasses his readers. So, it’s possible that “we” could refer to humans generally… and there are at least two verses in the New Testament where a collective pronoun is used this way: Acts 4:12 and 2 Peter 3:9.

Another example of the kind of pronoun use I’m suggesting is found in Isaiah 64:5. Isaiah was, of course, a believer; he was saved. But in this verse, Isaiah is addressing God and says:

“You are indeed angry, for we have sinned. In these ways we continue; and we need to be saved.”

 The English translations use the pronoun “we” in this passage, and I’ll assume that the translators have accurately captured Isaiah’s intent, and that there is widespread agreement about that. With that in mind, notice that even though Isaiah is already saved, he’s still using a pronoun which includes himself in the group that “needs to be saved,” and that “we” appears to refer to humans generally. I’ll grant that this is not a carbon copy of the scenario we find in 1 John, but it demonstrates a certain “freedom” with pronouns that some want to deny when they get to 1 John.

Recently I listened to a lesson from a Free Grace teacher which was centered on the truths of salvation. Addressing a congregation of believers, the pastor said the following:

“When you trust Christ as savior, He declares you as righteous and He gives you—as a free gift—everlasting life.”

 Notice that this is a conditional statement. He could just as easily have said “If you trust in Christ…” But more importantly, notice that his statement is conditional even though he’s addressing people to whom the condition no longer applies. The people in his congregation have met the condition already, and yet he’s addressing them as though they haven’t. Why? Because he is re-iterating to them a basic salvation truth. And as a “consumer” of Free Grace teaching, I find I am on the receiving end of this sort of thing frequently. It is quite a normal phenomenon in my experience. This occurred to me while listening to a trusted Free Grace teacher as he taught on 1 John 1:9 and said, essentially, that John couldn’t be talking about salvation because his audience was already saved. I immediately thought “Wait a minute… I’m saved, and I hear about salvation all the time.” In fact, I had heard about it quite a bit from this same pastor who now seemed to be telling me that such things never happen. I mean no disrespect to this pastor—one reason why I don’t wish to name him—but this is quite a large non-sequitur.

It’s important to point out, however, that it would not make sense for John to be “presenting the gospel” to this particular audience. And notice that in the practical example offered above, the pastor is not presenting the gospel to his audience. That isn’t his intent because he expects that the people to whom he’s speaking have already accepted the gospel. Nevertheless, he is teaching them about salvation, re-iterating the basic truths of salvation because, quite obviously, those truths need to be beat into our heads repeatedly. And it appears that New Testament writers recognized the wisdom of doing just that. Consider 2 Peter 1:12 where Peter writes:

“For this reason I will not be negligent to remind you always of these things, though you know and are established in the present truth.”

Peter recognizes how important it is to remind his audience of truths they are already aware of, and isn’t it interesting that Peter thinks it’s negligent not to?

The notion that the collective pronouns in 1 John 1:6-10 refer to humans in general is entirely defensible from grammar and from context. But, there is something else that tends to bother people about this idea: It asks the reader to believe that these antecedents change rather abruptly. Although this may seem counterintuitive, I have found numerous examples where such changes are evident and, in fact, undeniable. The first example is in 1 John 1, and is recognized even by those who teach the Frangible Fellowship view.

The collective pronouns “we,” “us” and “our” in the first five verses of 1 John cannot refer to the same antecedent as the same pronouns in verses 6-10. We know this because his audience never saw, heard and touched Jesus. John is talking about a group of people (the apostles) who had done these things, and then told this audience about it. The teachers who teach the Frangible Fellowship view, then, are comfortable with antecedents changing abruptly because they go on to teach that in verses 6-10 the collective pronouns refer to John and his audience, not John and the apostles as in verses 1-5.
Two more examples can be found in Acts 4:9-4:12 (pronoun: we) and also 2 Peter 3:2-9 (pronoun: us).

In the end, we shouldn’t be uncomfortable with the idea that the antecedents to pronouns change, and we should recognize even in our own communication that we use pronouns in a very fluid manner.

As I’ve discussed this idea about the pronouns with those who teach this traditional view, I’ve been reminded frequently that John is addressing believers. These reminders, while well-intentioned, often come after I’ve already made it clear that I also believe John is addressing believers. And even after I clarify again, the reminders seem to keep coming. The reason for this is a foundational assumption that “we” and “us” must be confined to John and his readers. It ignores the very real possibility that in these verses John is addressing his audience as mere human beings… and much like the example above, John is treating his audience as if they have not yet believed, as he re-iterates to them these basic truths of salvation.

Bad Design is Still Design

One very popular argument against Intelligent Design is the argument from suboptimal design. It seems that many are persuaded by this argument, but it really doesn't take a whole lot of careful thought to see how ineffective such an argument is.

In a more general version of the argument, our critic might make reference to species which have gone extinct, or they might simply poke fun at how our health deteriorates as we age, and that eventually our bodies give out entirely, all while insisting that this is "crappy design."

Unfortunately, the person who offers such an argument forgets that automobiles, aircraft, ships, buildings, trains, computers, bicycles--and a million other things we use daily--all have finite longevity and are all products of Intelligent Design. Is someone actually going to say that a Lycoming aircraft engine is a "crappy design" because, for example, the engine will require an overhaul after around 2000 hours of operation? Passenger aircraft have a finite longevity as well, established by the very company that designed and manufactured it. Once a particular Boeing 747 has endured a certain number of pressurization cycles, the whole airframe must be scrapped. Does this mean that a Boeing 747 is a "crappy design?" I would challenge the ID critic to cite just one known product of Intelligent Design that will not wear out and become non-functional at some point in time. Obviously, Intelligent Design and limited longevity are quite compatible with each other.

The reason that argument seems attractive to many ID critics is that they they have a fundamental misunderstanding of the term "Intelligent Design." The word "intelligent" is not meant to be a description of the "quality" of a given design. A primitive arrowhead carved from a piece of flint is as much the product of Intelligent Design as the most modern, precision-engineered bowhunting arrowhead.

So it isn't whether the design is good or bad that tells us whether something is the product of Intelligent Design. When we say that something is the product of Intelligent Design, it's not because the design is good or bad. Rather, it's because we see that someone had to use intelligence to produce the thing in question, and intelligence boils down to the ability to make goal-oriented choices.

When you look at man's early attempts at flight, you will see a comical array of hopeless contraptions none of which had any hope of getting off the ground.  In spite of this, each was a product of intelligent design because someone made choices oriented toward achieving a particular goal. Even if those choices were bad choices, they were still choices oriented toward a goal and that is intelligent design.

Of course, we need to be prepared to deal with the more specific appeals to "bad design" as well.

But first, let's examine the structure of the argument. Anyone who points to examples of "bad design" to make a case against Intelligent Design is essentially saying that if something has a design flaw, it cannot be the product of Intelligent Design. But this raises an important question: Can we see design flaws in things which we know are products of Intelligent Design? If the answer is "Yes," then their argument is dead on arrival. And of course there are numerous examples of just this sort of thing:

In July of 1981, approximately 2,000 people assembled inside the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri to watch a dance competition. Spectators filled suspended walkways on the second, third, and fourth floors when, tragically, the structural support for the fourth floor bridge caused the collapse of two of the walkways, killing 114 people and injuring more than 200. The actual architect's design wasn't flawed, but the people building the structure departed from the architect's specs and essentially substituted their own design, and it turned out to be badly flawed.

In the mid '90s, General Motors took a lot of heat over a pickup truck design that placed the fuel tanks outboard of the frame rails, creating a serious fire hazard in the event of a side impact. Indeed, engineers were responsible for the design, and these engineers--like all other humans--were intelligent. But here we have a good example of suboptimal design, undeniably the product of Intelligent Design.

On January 28, 1986 the space shuttle Challenger and seven crew members were lost in a massive explosion about 73 seconds after lift-off. The explosion was caused by the failure of an O-ring in one of the field joints in the right-side rocket booster. A design flaw in the O-rings made them vulnerable to wide temperature variations and this, along with poor decision-making at NASA, lead to the destruction of “Challenger” and her crew.

These three examples all demonstrate conclusively that the presence of design flaws is entirely compatible with Intelligent Design. The hotel, the pickup truck and the rocket booster are all the products of Intelligent Design, and yet they all exhibited certain design flaws.

Having said all of that, it's important to note that I'm not actually conceding that there are examples of suboptimal design in nature… I sincerely doubt there are any. But Richard Dawkins certainly thinks he's found some…

A YouTube video features Richard Dawkins and Randolph Nesse discussing the human eye. The entire conversation is about how the human eye supposedly disproves Intelligent Design. The video is instructive for several reasons. Speaking of the human eye, Randolph Nesse says the following:

"It's a perfect example of why the body is not designed. I mean, imagine a camera designer for a famous camera company like Nikon or Pentax who put the wires between the light and the film, which is how our eye is working."

Perhaps Nesse should have quit while he was ahead. He was doing fine until he had to admit that our "eye is working" in spite of what might appear to be a rather odd design.

He goes on to point out the the human eye has a blind spot, and he and Dawkins actually demonstrate this for the video. But then Nesse does something he shouldn't have: He keeps talking. After exposing the blind spot, he says this:

"What's amazing, though, about how natural selection has made the eye so that it works despite this built-in flaw, is that the eye constantly jiggles slightly. We call it 'nystagmus,' and this seems like a problem, but it's actually a solution."

It's obvious what Nesse has just done, and not all that cleverly. Whatever he sees as a design failure is evidence against Intelligent Design, but everything he sees as a design success counts as evidence for Darwinism. Convenient, isn't it? This is a classic case of "heads I win, tails you lose." But Nesse continues:

"Because if it wasn't for the eye jiggling constantly…, that blind spot would always be in the same spot and you'd never see anything there. But because the eye moves slightly, you end up getting complete coverage of your field of vision."

Curiously, Nesse refuses to see this as a designer's work-around aimed at optimizing the function of the eye, and Dawkins' own comment is that in spite of this serious flaw, the human eye is "a remarkably fine instrument." This is odd, because earlier in the video Dawkins cites a famous German psychologist named Helmholtz who said that "If an engineer had given him the human eye, he'd have sent it back." Why send back a "remarkably fine instrument?" These men are truly grasping at straws.

The fundamental problem with the argument from suboptimal design is rather simple: The only way you can assess the design of a particular system is if you have knowledge of all of the design objectives. You don't have to be an engineer to understand that engineering is all about balancing and optimizing multiple competing design objectives. A bicycle frame needs to be very strong, but it also needs to be very light. Making the frame strong would be fairly straightforward: Just carve the shape out of solid steel. Likewise, making the frame very, very light would be simple as well: Paper tubes, perhaps. But of course both would be useless… the solid steel frame would be too heavy and the paper frame would lack the necessary strength. What Dawkins and Nesse refuse to acknowledge is that they don't really know enough about all the design objectives that needed to be balanced to give us the eyes we have and so they're really not qualified to assess the design one way or another, and neither am I.

One rather odd example of this argument from suboptimal design came to me from a long-time friend of mine who asked me why men have nipples. Hmm. Good question. And I can see why, on the surface, this seems like a really strange design feature for men and I could see why it would make my friend scratch his head a bit. But when you actually dig for answers, this question ends up exposing a powerful argument for design.

The reason why men have nipples is actually quite simple: Every man starts out as a female. Every egg is female by default, and so has specification for all of the appropriate equipment. When an egg is fertilized by a sperm carrying a Y chromosome, those specifications get altered and a few weeks into development, what would have been ovaries become testicles, etc. But here's where we uncover a surprising argument for design: If we find an object that has useless features, does that mean it was not designed? Well, turns out the answer is "No."

I'm a car enthusiast, and I noticed that if you could look at the engine block of just about any car out there, you would likely find features on that engine block that are completely useless in that particular car. I'm talking about features common to cast parts like engine blocks, cylinder heads and manifolds called "bosses." A "boss" is a raised, reinforced part of an engine block's casting that is typically drilled and tapped to accept a fastener of some sort. A modern engine block is likely to be adorned with quite a few of these, but in any given car, only some will be used. And so, if you could get in there to see it, you would find that in any given car, there are a number of entirely useless casting bosses. In one car model, the engine might be mounted longitudinally while in other models the engine might be transverse-mounted, and this might require different mounting points where a different set of bosses are used.

Engineers are smart… if a particular type of engine is going to be used in different car models, they're only going to want to create one mold for the engine block, it's far more efficient. That one mold will yield a block that has provisions for mounting it in any of the car models designed with that engine in mind. But, as each engine is installed in individual cars, some bosses are not going to be used. And so you're left with these "empty" bosses--they're even drilled and tapped--but nothing gets bolted to them. They had a use, but because that engine ended up in car model X rather than car model Y, they no longer have a use.

A similar scheme can be seen here with the nipples on men. The nipples had an intended use in a potential sort of way, but because the egg ended up getting fertilized with a Y-chromosome instead of X, those nipples will never serve that potential purpose. The point is that this isn't bad design at all… it's actually quite good design. Or, at the very least, it's a design strategy that is easy to find in things that we know are products of Intelligent Design.

The moral of this story is that when you encounter this argument from suboptimal design, whether it's the human eye or the laryngeal nerve in a giraffe's neck, there's no need to give up any ground at all. Even IF we were to concede to certain design flaws in biology, (and we shouldn't) we know that in general, design flaws are not incompatible with Intelligent Design. But we also know that we can't even determine whether the curious routing of the laryngeal nerve in a giraffe is a "design flaw" because we don't know all the competing design objectives, and neither does the critic. All we can really say is that it's curious… even baffling. And there are many things that we use every day that have features which, if we were to pay attention, would puzzle us. But that never means that the object wasn't designed… in fact we know--whether it's a toaster oven or a hat rack--that it was the product of Intelligent Design. And so curious--even apparently useless--design features are not incompatible with Intelligent Design, which means that the argument from suboptimal design is a very poorly designed argument

Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory

Recently The Gospel Coalition posted an outline from a 1994 book by Don Whitney called "How Can I Be Sure I'm a Christian: What the Bible Says About Assurance of Salvation". To be fair, there are a few things in the outline that the author gets right. But the take-home message in the outline is this: None of us can really be sure that we're saved. And that's ironic, since it's a book about assurance of salvation.

Remember that the metaphor for this blog uses a skydiver to illustrate something important about trust. A smart skydiver always packs a reserve 'chute. But the reason he does is simple: He doesn't trust his main 'chute. If the main 'chute fails to open, the skydiver can cut the main 'chute loose and deploy the reserve 'chute, and the skydiver lives to tell the tale.

The gospel is different, however. It requires no reserve 'chute. In fact, it demands no reserve 'chute. In the gospel, God has invited us to jump out of the plane with one 'chute, Jesus Christ. Those are the terms. When we bring a reserve, we have failed to trust in the main 'chute.

So, I'm going to take a closer look at this outline and see how many reserve 'chutes it contains.

I. Assurance of Salvation: Is It Possible?

1. It is possible, indeed normal, for Christians to experience assurance of salvation
2. It is possible, indeed normal, for a non-Christian to have a false assurance of salvation

Now, it's not that I disagree with the author's two sub-points here… but it's curious that he's left out a category: It's also possible, indeed normal, for people to have no assurance. Anyone who isn't Christian in the broadest sense of the word would fall into that category. And this is interesting, because by focusing here on non-Christians with false assurance, he reveals that Christians can't really have assurance. After all, maybe the assurance you think you have is actually a false assurance and you're not really a Christian. How would you know?

Of course, we would expect, since this is a book about assurance, that the author will give us a way to know. But what we'll discover is that, well… he doesn't. In the end, the author does more to create doubts than he does to squash them.

II. Having Doubts about Your Salvation: It is possible, indeed normal, for Christians to have occasional doubts about their salvation. Doubting assurance is not unbelief. The causes of doubt are many:

1. Spiritual immaturity may contribute to doubts about assurance.
2. Sensitivity to sin may cause confusion about assurance.
3. Comparison with other Christians may cloud assurance.
4. Childhood conversion affects the assurance of some.

I agree with this group of points as well. All those things can contribute to a Christian's doubts about their salvation. But here's an interesting question: "Why?" And the answer is very simple. Because many Christians are taught that if they are failing to grow spiritually, they might not be saved. And because many Christians are taught that if they sin too much, they might not be saved. And if they aren't as good as the next guy, they might not be saved, and if their conversion happened during childhood, they might not be saved. And oddly enough, this very book will teach exactly those things. So why should we be surprised that having doubts about your salvation is normal? We are typically taught (quite erroneously) to be skeptical about our salvation. And the author of this book only makes that worse.

III. The Basis of Assurance: The assurance of salvation rests primarily on

1. the character of God 
2. the works of Jesus Christ
3. the truth of God’s promises

Ahhh. Yes. Absolutely right. Now, let's see if the author sticks to these three things as the basis for assurance.

IV. An Inner Confirmation: Assurance may be experienced partly through the inner confirmation of the Holy Spirit. How does the Holy Spirit give Christians this assurance?

1. He opens our minds to understand the Bible in ways that give us assurance.
2. He guides our thinking about the biblical marks of salvation in our lives.
3. He brings Scripture and its truths to our minds in various ways that assure us.
4. He causes an inner sense of assurance without words.

This is an interesting point because it seems eerily similar to what Mormons teach. They claim to receive an "inner witness" or "inner testimony" that, for example, the Book of Mormon is true. This, for obvious reasons, makes me a little uncomfortable. It's very subjective, isn't it?

Having said that, because the Holy Spirit inspired the words of scripture, we can say that the HS gives us assurance because there are verses of scripture that are intended to give us assurance. So, I'm on board with that.

I'm concerned, however, about these "Biblical marks of salvation in our lives." This is another area where doubts are created, not destroyed. A "mark of salvation" is a sign; an indicator that a person is actually saved. But if we were to base our assurance on such indicators (assuming they exist) then these indicators would need to be reliable, unmistakable. If, for example, it's possible for unsaved people to exhibit any of the same indicators, then it could not be said that such indicators are "reliable." A "reliable" indicator is one that can't and won't lead you to a false conclusion.

V. Signs of Eternal Life: Assurance may be experienced partly through the presence of the attitudes and actions the Bible says will accompany salvation [1 John].

1. Do you share the intimacies of the Christian life with other believers?
2. Do you have a deep awareness of your sin against the word and love of God?
3. Do you live in conscious obedience to the word of God?
4. Do you despise the world and its ways? 
5. Do you long for the return of Jesus Christ and to be made like him?
6. Do you habitually do what is right more and sin less?
7. Do you love other Christians sacrificially and want to be with them?
8. Do you discern the presence of the Holy Spirit within you?
9. Do you enjoy listening to the doctrines the apostles of Jesus taught?
10. Do you believe what the Bible teaches about Jesus Christ?

And here the author begins to reveal some of these indicators, these "Biblical marks" of salvation. And while all of these things are good, desirable, admirable… only one of these can actually provide assurance, only one of these is actually a reliable indicator. Do you believe what the Bible teaches about Jesus Christ? If the answer is "Yes," then all the rest is superfluous. And the other points--all nine of them--are reserve 'chutes. For example, I might ask myself (as the author suggests):

"Do I live in conscious obedience to the word of God?"

And if I answer "Yes" and if I take that as confirmation that I am saved, then I have just donned a reserve 'chute. I'm no longer relying or trusting on the main 'chute.

And what's the main 'chute? Well, the author himself told us in Point III what the "primary basis of assurance" consists of. The author said those three things were 1) the character of God, 2) the works of Christ and 3) the truth of God’s promises.

But now the author wants me to base my assurance on whether or not I live in conscious obedience to the word of God. He's actually telling me to trust in something other than the three things he said form the basis of assurance!! And not just one thing, but nine other things!

VI. A Spiritual Mind-set: Only those who are spiritually minded are Christians. You are spiritual minded when you think about the things of God:

1. spontaneously and without external causes
2. more than anything else
3. with more delight and enjoyment than anything else.
4. You are not spiritually minded if “God is not in all [your] thoughts.”

This entire category is not only ambiguous and subjective, but it's one big, giant reserve 'chute. Why should I stake my salvation on how "spiritually minded" I am if I'm really relying on the one thing that can really give me assurance? (Point III again) The truth is, the only reason I would need to make such an assessment is if I was not relying on God's character, promises and Christ's work. And that means I'm packing a reserve.

VII. Things That Erode Our Assurance: A true Christian may lose a sense of assurance of salvation because…

1. he or she refuses to deal with known sin
2. of spiritual laziness
3. of satanic attacks 
4. of trials or harsh circumstances
5. of illness or temperament
6. God seems to withdraw a sense of his presence and blessing.

I could add something like:

    7. Books like "How Can I Be Sure I’m a Christian?" by Don Whitney

Seriously, though… the refusal to "deal with known sin" may, in fact, erode a person's assurance. But only if they haven't fully comprehended the magnitude of God's grace and only if they've failed to understand the gospel. What does 1 John 2:2 say? It says that if anyone sins, we have an advocate in Jesus Christ. Jude 24 says Jesus Christ presents us faultless before the Glory of God.

This is what the Bible teaches about Jesus Christ, and remember that believing what the Bible teaches about Jesus Christ was the one thing from Point V that can actually give you assurance!

The person who has jumped out of the plane with one 'chute (Christ) has no reason to think that sin theaters their relationship with God. This person understands and believes that Christ has taken care of that completely, and so it's no longer an issue when it comes to salvation. This person understands Romans 8:1 when Paul says "There is no condemnation to those are in Christ Jesus," and they understand John 5:24 when Jesus Himself says "…he who hears My word and believes in Him who sent Me has everlasting life, and shall not come into judgment."

In other words, the person who relies on Christ, believes and understands that their sins are forgiven. Period.

VIII. Common Problems with Uncertainty

1. Those converted as children may experience special difficulties with assurance.
2. Those who remember little else besides following Christ sometimes have doubts that those with adult or dramatic conversions do not.
3. Concrete childhood thinking differs from more abstract adult thinking.
4. An awareness of the Lordship of Christ must expand to cover all the ever-expanding circle of life that comes with maturity.
5. Stay-at-home mothers of young children may experience special difficulties with assurance.
6. True assurance won’t lead to spiritual carelessness.
7. Those worried about the unforgivable sin have not committed it.

That people who don't "convert" until adulthood might have more dramatic conversion experiences than people who accepted the gospel as children is a reality… but it shouldn't be a source of doubt because everyone should understand that it's not about the experience.

The final point about the unforgivable sin is worth commenting on as well, but it's hard to do so without getting into the controversy over just what the "unforgivable sin" is. I'm going to avoid that, however, and just say that if his statement is true, then whoever is worried about the unforgivable sin is saved. Belief in Christ isn't necessary… just make sure you're worrying about the unforgivable sin. Then you'll be alright.

I analyze a similar argument in Assurance by Works; A Reserve 'Chute Case Study.

IX. False Assurance of Salvation: Sources of a false assurance of salvation

1. A public commitment or outward response to the gospel
2. Baptism
3. Involvement with church
4. A strong Christian family heritage An abundance of good deeds
5. An extraordinary experience
6. A dramatic personal or lifestyle change
7. Material blessing and financial security
8. A false understanding of God
9. A false understanding of sin and hell

I agree completely that the first eight indicators listed here are unreliable indicators of salvation. In other words, just because someone has been baptized doesn't necessarily mean they're saved. That someone's involved with church doesn't necessarily mean they're saved. That someone has an abundance of good deeds doesn't necessarily mean that they're saved. That someone had a dramatic lifestyle change doesn't mean that they're saved. But we'll see very shortly that the author recommends that you do some of these very things if you're still not sure. We're almost there.

X. Characteristics of the falsely assured

1. They are either unconcerned or angry when warned about false assurance.
2. They are either legalistic or loose with spiritual disciplines and duties.
3. They are either very weak in or very confident of their Bible knowledge.
4. They have either a vicarious Christianity or an overly independent spirit.
5. They may be constantly resisting the truth or never able to come to the truth.

This is an interesting list of characteristics. Notice the contrasts… on one end of the spectrum you might be apathetic when warned about false assurance, and on the other end you might be angry. You might be legalistic, or you might be sloppy with spiritual disciplines. You might be very insecure about your knowledge of Bible doctrine, or you might be overly confident. You might depend on other's too much, or you've gone off on your own.

Makes me think of Goldilocks and the Three Bears. If your porridge is too hot or too cold, you might be falsely assured. But if your porridge is "just right" then I guess you're okay. Either way, your experience with respect to assurance now depends upon your performance in the categories put forth by this author. If you set off this author's alarm bells, then you should have doubts.

But should we have doubts? Is Christ trustworthy or not? In Point II of the outline, the author wrote:

"Doubting assurance is not unbelief."

Hmmm. Let's take a look at it: What is "assurance," exactly? Assurance is an abstract noun which refers to the state of being assured, is it not? What does it mean to be assured of something? Or, what does it mean to assure someone else of something? Is that not synonymous with making a promise?

"I assure you, I will be there to pick you up at 10:00." Would the expectation be any different if I said "I promise you" instead of "I assure you?" No, it wouldn't. Would it make any difference if I said "Verily, verily I say unto you, I will be there to pick you up at 10:00." Or maybe I would say "Most assuredly…" or "Truly, truly." Makes no difference, does it? These are all PROMISES. And what did Christ say in John 6:47 and about a dozen other places? He said:

"Most assuredly, I say to you, he who believes in Me has everlasting life."

If I've promised to pick you up at 10:00, and you have doubts about whether or not you'll be left stranded, why wouldn't we call that "unbelief?" If you believed my promise, how could you have doubts?

Is Christ trustworthy? If He is, then why not just believe Him? He said that if you do, then you have everlasting life. What's to doubt?

So what does this mean, then? Does this mean I'm "unconcerned" about assurance? Or am I angry? Am I being legalistic or loose with spiritual disciplines? Am I being either weak or over-confident in my knowledge of Bible doctrine? Am I overly independent? Am I guilty of an offense by simply believing Christ's promises and being confident in them?

Simply put, doubting assurance (or salvation) is the very definition of unbelief. If you believe, then you have accepted Christ's assurance to you. End of story.

The final point in the outline is a list of things to do in case you're still not sure. Let's take a look:

XI. What to Do If You’re Still Not Sure

1. Don’t take for granted that you understand the gospel.
2. Think deeply about the gospel.
3. Repent of all known sin.
4. Submit everything to the Lordship of Christ.
5. Meditate much on 1 John.
6. Don’t doubt the promises of God.
7. Believe as best you can and pray for greater faith.
8. Practice the spiritual disciplines.
9. If you really love God, take assurance because non-Christians don’t love God passionately.
10. If you hate your sin, take assurance because non-Christians don’t hate sin deeply.
11. If you’ve never been baptized, present yourself as a candidate in obedience to Christ.
12. Don’t neglect the Lord’s Supper.
13. Don’t compare earthly fathers to your Heavenly Father.
14. Seek godly counsel if the doubts persist.
15. Pray for assurance.
16. Wait patiently upon God to give you a fuller experience of assurance.

Hmmm. Okay, I'll grant that it's possible to have a poor understanding of the gospel. But if I can never reach a point where I say "Yes, I understand the gospel," then how in the world can I ever have assurance?

Think deeply about the gospel? What does this mean? Repent of all known sin? Submit everything to the Lordship of Christ? How will what I do help give me assurance?

Meditate much on 1 John? I think he means "Meditate much on the way I understand 1 John." First John is a difficult book, and I'm convinced that it's widely misunderstood. It should be a source of assurance, because (the way I've come to understand it) it emphasizes our secure position in Christ. It emphasizes that God sees us as without sin. But the popular view of 1 John is a view which could be added to the authors list of things which erode assurance.

Number 6 is the only valid point among fifteen: Don't doubt the promises of God. In other words, believe!!

We began talking about reserve 'chutes. In Point 9, the author says that you should be assured if "you really love God." This is a reserve 'chute. Your love for God cannot provide you assurance. believing God's promises, however, can. Likewise, hating your sin cannot provide you assurance. But believing God's promises will.

The next point is very interesting, because earlier the author presented a list of sources of false assurance. And what was the second item in that list? It was baptism. Baptism, the author says, is a source of false assurance. And yet, here he offers baptism as a solution to doubts about assurance!!

He also says that not neglecting the Lord's Supper is a solution to doubts about assurance. So with respect to baptism and the Lord's Supper, we are supposed to rely upon rituals which we perform for our assurance? That's stuff that WE do. That's a reserve 'chute. How 'bout this instead: "Don't doubt the promises of God. Believe!!"

Alright, I'll give the author point 14 too… seeking godly counsel is not a bad idea. Hopefully that Godly counsel won't consult this book, however. Hopefully the Godly counsel will exhort the doubting person to simply believe.

Pray for assurance? In the Bible, God has already given us every assurance, has He not? I'm not opposed to prayer in general, of course… and perhaps if someone does pray for assurance, God will find a way to remind them of just what assurance is, and that if they'll simply believe His promises, they'll have assurance.

Don Whitney's "How Can I Be Sure I’m a Christian?" really adds up to one giant discouragement regarding assurance of salvation. It snatches defeat from the jaws of victory. The sum total of the message is this: Assurance is really impossible, but we're going to pretend that relying on our own performance gives us some kind of assurance, even though we know it can't.

Almost all of Whitney's solutions amount to relying on things other than God's promises for assurance of salvation. In other words, he's telling folks to carry a reserve, and this just reveals (or requires) distrusting their main 'chute. And because we know that the fabric and thread that we use to sew our reserve 'chutes together with are inherently defective, our reserve 'chutes can never give us assurance. Only one thing can: Believing Christ's promises.

Thinking About Divine Freedom

In my last post I said we'd get to the issue of Divine freedom. Recently Bob Nyberg of New Tribes Mission  sent me a link to an interesting critique of Libertarian freedom, and in it the author affirms what I've concluded about how best to describe God's freedom. But before I get to that, there are a few items in this author's critique that stood out and which warrant a response. In the critique, J.W. Hendryx wrote:

"One of the main objections of Arminians, Semi-pelagians and other synergists to divine election is based on moral rather than exegetical grounds."

This statement is a good example of the warped paradigm that the Calvinist must operate within. That the author considers the view he's opposing to be "synergism" demonstrates a disregard for the notion, as taught by the apostle Paul, that trusting in something is not work, has no merit, has no value. If I trust my neighbor to feed my pets while I'm away, I am not going to be the one feeding my pets. My neighbor gets all the credit for that, I am indebted to my neighbor for doing that work for me. So, this author has a distorted view of Monergism and, as a Calvinist, it is actually he that will end up embracing synergism. For a more in-depth exploration of this distorted view of Monergism, read Monergism Distorted.

There's more in the statement that's worth commenting about. Where do we get our ideas of what is moral and immoral? Is it not from exegesis? Where do we get our ideas of what is just and unjust? Is it not from exegesis? Have we no exegetical basis on which we can say "God is Just?" In other words, to characterize the objection as based on "moral rather than exegetical grounds" is to advance a false dichotomy. If a person's sense of morality comes from exegesis, then their objection is based upon exegesis!

Hendryx also wrote:

"I have heard many of them contend that the Augustinian view of God is morally repugnant since God could and would never force humans to do something against their will."

Here, the author mischaracterizes the objection. If God created humans without free will, there's nothing morally repugnant about that. God created lots of things which lack free will. That God would create humans without free will, and then hold them responsible for something… that is morally repugnant.

If someone created a robot and programmed that robot to kill another person, would it be just to hold the robot responsible? Of course not! We would know that the robot was merely doing what it was programmed to do and we would prosecute the person who programmed the robot! If the only way to understand God's sovereignty is to say that He determines our actions and we lack the freedom to choose, then why would God hold us responsible for doing things when He was the one who caused us to do it?

"We all know that the Arminians teach that man has a free will in the libertarian sense. What this means, simply is that they believe man has the ability to choose otherwise. That is, they affirm that human beings are free to choose between opposites ... to make choices uninfluenced any prior prejudice, inclination, or disposition. They believe the will, being neutral, can just as easily choose good or evil. On the surface this may seem reasonable but when you think about it for a moment it makes no sense because deep down we know, and the Scriptures affirm, that a person must always choose according to what he is by nature, otherwise how could the choice be rightfully said to be his own? Let us never forget that the nature of a person is not a thing he possesses. It is something he is. For example, When a person loves evil by nature, he will always make choices in line with what that nature desires most."

This paragraph contains at least a couple examples of deliberate distortions of Libertarian freedom. The author claims that under Libertarian freedom the will is "neutral." But this is not necessarily the case. There is no denial that the will is inclined toward evil. But Libertarian freedom simply allows for the possibility of making choices contrary to that inclination. That's not the same as neutrality.

The author is quite confident that a person "must always choose according to what he is by nature." And yet, it's quite clear that even fallen, unregenerate people choose against committing sin at least on occasion. And we also know that Christians choose to commit sin, something that is contrary to their new nature in Christ. So the ability to choose contrary to our nature--whether unregenerate or regenerate--is demonstrable. So, the author's statement that:

"When a person loves evil by nature, he will always make choices in line with what that nature desires most."

…is demonstrably false.

Then the author asks:

"The question is, does God have a free will in the libertarian sense? i.e. Is God able to …choose good or evil? And if not does this mean human beings have more freedom than God?"

This is a very interesting question. Is the ability to choose good or evil necessarily superior to the ability only to choose good? Is that what we want to say? This is what is implied by the author, is it not? He believes that if we think of humans as having Libertarian freedom, then humans have more freedom; a superior kind of freedom, when compared to God. The author would be right to expect that God's freedom should be superior to man's freedom. But superior in what way, exactly? Perhaps we shouldn't jump to conclusions about what kind of freedom is superior.

I think the author is right when he says that God's freedom should be described as "Compatibilist" freedom. I think Compatibilism is a very good way to describe God's freedom as long as we are careful to point out that we do not believe that God's decisions are determined by any external cause. And, because of how Compatibilism is sometimes defined, this can be difficult to do. The very name "Compatibilism" refers to a supposed "compatibility" between determinism and free will, which essentially means it would affirm both.

But wait a minute… determinism is the idea that choices are determined by an external entity. For example, a marionette's actions are determined by the puppeteer; they are not the product of the marionette's will. The marionette, in fact, has no will. So, to the extent that Compatibilism affirms determinism, we cannot use Compatibilism to describe God's freedom, can we? How could God be God if His actions were determined by some external entity?

So, some care must be taken when it comes to defining Compatibilism if we're going to use that term to describe God's freedom. It seems like the aspect of Compatibilism that the author has in mind is the idea that God's own character or nature constrains God's choices. To use the author's example, God is not free in the sense that He cannot choose to lie. And I agree entirely with the author on this point. We might say that God freely chooses to do good, but only good. The choices to do evil are not available to God, but only because of His nature, not because some external entity is preventing Him from going in that direction.

We could use J Warner Wallace's term for Compatibilism, which is "self-fettered free will." Wallace uses the term "unfettered free will" as an alternate term for Libertarian freedom. With these terms, it's easy to see that God's will is "self-fettered." His own character, His own nature, constrains His choices. And yet, since no external entity is determining His choices for Him, we can say that He is truly free.

J Warner Wallace describes Compatibilism (self-fettered free will) this way:

  "Humans have the ability to choose something, …but they always are restrained by their pre-existing nature… You are limited in your choices because you're not going to choose [those things which are contrary to your nature]. You only choose WITHIN YOUR NATURE."

And of course, he's talking here about human freedom. But I think it's obvious that God is restrained in His choices by His pre-existing nature. He will not choose those things which are contrary to His nature, He only chooses within His nature. But is this an apt description of human freedom? Well… certainly not in this life. For more analysis of this question, please read here and here.

If our nature inclines us toward evil and we are unable to choose contrary to that inclination, then how do you account for the fact that unregenerate people do not commit sin at every opportunity they're given? It ought to be impossible for an unregenerate, "natural" man to choose against committing any particular sin at any point in time.

Also, we know that regenerate (born again) persons choose to commit sins, even though this is clearly contrary to the new nature that they've been given. As a description of human freedom, Compatibilism utterly fails to explain this, while Libertarian freedom seems to accommodate it quite comfortably.

And by the same token, Libertarian freedom would be an inappropriate description of God's freedom because if God had Libertarian freedom, then He would not be constrained by His nature and, if He wasn't constrained by His nature, then He wouldn't be God.

So, perhaps the author here has jumped to a conclusion about which freedom is superior. If God is the greatest possible being (and I think He is) and God has Compatiblist freedom, then Compatibilist freedom must be the greatest possible kind of freedom! And because we affirm that mankind is made in the image of God, and yet isn't God's equal (read this for more about being made in God's image) then we should expect that man has an inferior kind of freedom.

So maybe it's wrong to say that Libertarian freedom is a superior kind of freedom. Maybe the ability to choose contrary to one's nature should be viewed as a defect, not an advantage!

There's still one remaining issue, though… human freedom in Heaven. We're not given many details about Heaven, but we are told that we will be free from sin. And that's difficult for any of us to imagine. But I think that some of the mystery goes away if we anticipate that when we receive our resurrection bodies, we will lose our defective Libertarian free will and our freedom will become like God's in the sense that we will freely choose to do those things which are consistent with our new, glorified nature. At that point, Compatibilism will become an apt way of describing human freedom. We will be free from the Old Sin Nature and the new nature will reign absolutely.

Hindsight's Monday Morning Quarterbacking

There's another argument which gets deployed as a challenge against the idea of Libertarian Freedom, and it's an argument which, at first glance, seems to have some rhetorical force… but when you think it through carefully, the argument absolutely collapses.

Basically, it goes like this: If, in this life, we can choose where we want to live in the future, (Heaven or Hell) but we can't choose a different option once we are there, then we must not really be free. If God gives us freedom, why doesn't he make that freedom permanent? If God can remove our freedom in the future, why must He give us freedom now? If God allows us to choose either Heaven or Hell during this life, then why does He take that choice away once we're in Heaven? On Earth, I'm free to choose Heaven or Hell because God gave me this freedom, but in Heaven I'm not free to choose Heaven or Hell because God removed this freedom. That's the argument.

But this argument really fails on a few levels. First of all, it's really quite misleading to say that we choose Heaven or Hell in this life. There's no denying that the choice we make in this life results in Heaven or Hell. But we don't actually choose Heaven or Hell directly. Our choice is between believing the gospel or not believing the gospel. The Heaven or Hell part is really God's predetermined choice, not ours. That is, God decides that whoever believes the gospel will go to Heaven and whoever doesn't believe the gospel will go to Hell. To say that we choose Heaven or Hell directly is to erect a straw man.

The distinction here is subtle, but important. The effect of a choice is not the same as the choice itself. I can agree that we are "effectively" choosing Heaven or Hell. But the effects are what they are because of God's choice, not because of my choice. So it creates confusion to say that we're choosing Heaven or Hell. We're not. Nobody chooses Hell. God chooses Hell for everyone who does not choose to believe the gospel. Oh, sure… people want to rebel against God and they choose to do so… no dispute there. But nobody chooses to go to Hell. They choose not to trust in Christ, they choose to continue in their rebellion, and the effect of that choice is that they wind up in Hell.

This simple distinction really knocks the legs out from under the argument. But we can go further…

Even if we grant that our direct choice in this life is between Heaven and Hell, the case still cannot be made that our "choice is taken away" in Heaven because at the point that we "choose Heaven," we understand that Heaven is a place we won't be able to leave. And it's worth pointing out that we also understand that Heaven is a place we won't want to leave, and this is precisely why we would choose it. In other words, if we grant (for the sake of argument) that we directly choose Heaven or Hell, you could say that, when we choose to believe the gospel, we choose to forfeit the choice to leave Heaven. So even if we grant the premise, God can be seen to honor our choice by not allowing us to leave Heaven.

Even so, we shouldn't approach the question from such an invalid starting point. We should approach with the understanding that Heaven or Hell are consequences; effects; results of our choice either to believe the gospel or continue to reject it, and that God's plan of salvation makes salvation available to us during this life only and that salvation (Heaven) is the result of our choice to believe the gospel, not a result of our choosing Heaven.

If we choose Heaven directly, then everyone who chooses Heaven will go there.  I'm aware of a particular passage where assorted individuals are "choosing Heaven" in the direct sense and yet they're driven away by Christ. That is, these folks want in. They've chosen Heaven. The passage I'm thinking of is Matthew 7:21-23. This passage illustrates the unfortunate reality that lots of people "choose Heaven" directly and yet never get there. Why? Because although they chose to go to Heaven, they did NOT choose to trust in Christ but chose instead to trust in their works. And as a result, Christ ordered them to depart from Him. If we simply "choose Heaven" then Christ should have let those folks in. This underscores the important distinction between our direct choice and the effects or consequences of our choice. Those people chose to trust in their works rather that trust in Christ and as a result of this, Christ refused them. They chose Heaven, but ended up in Hell.

Essentially, this characterization of choosing Heaven or choosing Hell and God "taking our choice away" once we're in Heaven as an argument against Libertarian freedom is really a straw man and like any straw man argument, it fails spectacularly. There's a deep-seated desire to portray the Libertarian view as having elevated man to a position where he calls the shots. But what we see here is that man doesn't call the shots, he merely makes a choice: Believe the gospel, or continue to reject it.

Also related to this question of God "taking our freedom away," it's important to understand that God's plan of salvation is only available to us in this life. When we check out of this life, the opportunity for salvation has passed.

Hebrews 9:27: And as it is appointed for men to die once, but after this the judgment.

This means that when we pass from this life to the next, our fate is sealed one way or the other. There is no plan of salvation beyond that point. People in Hell don't have any further opportunity to be saved. This life is it. And those are the rules God put in place… there's nothing we can do to change them. He determines the consequences of our choices and in that way, He remains in charge. No one's usurping His authority. And the consequences, as God has determined it, are permanent either way.

We deal with this sort of thing regularly in the course of everyday life. It's why we have expressions like "Hindsight's 20/20" and "Monday morning quarterbacking." All the choices we make are permanent in one sense, and we all accept this.

If a skydiver has jumped from the plane, he cannot undo that choice. The rest is up to gravity. From the time he leaves the plane to the time he reaches the ground, his choices are very limited. He can't stop off at McDonald's on the way down, for a cheeseburger. That choice is unavailable to him. And if he forgot to strap on his parachute, well… there's no undoing history. He jumped out. That he will fall to the Earth (with or without the aid of a parachute) is simply inevitable. This doesn't violate the concept of Libertarian freedom in the least. Or if someone thinks it does, then they have a distorted understanding of just what Libertarian freedom actually entails.

The skydiver is free to choose to jump from the plane, but he's never free from the consequences of that choice. If his 'chute malfunctions, he can't alter the historical fact that he jumped from the plane. Libertarian freedom doesn't mean that we're free from the consequences of our choices… consequences are the whole reason we make choices to begin with! I choose to go fishing because that choice brings with it consequences: Fun. Peace. Quiet. Satisfaction. These are consequences. If I was free from consequences, why would I choose anything?

During this life, we make our choice: Believe the gospel or continue in unbelief. (there's no neutrality here) When death comes, the effects of that choice become permanent. Those are the rules which God set forth. We are free to choose to believe the gospel or continue to not believe the gospel, but we are never free from the consequences of those choices.

And a third and related point is that if a person understands the gospel properly when they choose to believe it, they understand that the choice they're making has permanent results. They understand that the consequence of choosing to believe the gospel is that they receive everlasting life. Frankly, that's  why they choose to believe!! If it wasn't permanent, if their future would remain insecure even after they made the choice, then why bother? For this reason, it makes no sense to say that God takes away my choice once I get to Heaven. The permanence of Heaven doesn't represent a forfeiture of my choice. Rather, it represents God delivering His promise of everlasting life.

Another related challenge is to point out that, apparently, we lose the freedom to sin once we're in Heaven, and so doesn't that represent a loss of freedom?

And here's where we'll launch into another discussion about Libertarian freedom vs. Compatibilist freedom. I have been careful in previous posts not to say that compatibilist freedom is never a reality. With certain qualifications, I'm convinced that Compatibilist freedom is an appropriate way to describe God's freedom and it's an appropriate way to describe our freedom once we're in Heaven.

I'll explain that further in the next post.

Playing Dominoes

There are many subtleties in this discussion of human freedom, and many ways that the debate gets skewed and misdirected by straw man arguments and red herrings. I'm going to attempt to deal with one of these fallacious arguments here, and then in my next post I'll deal with another.

Let's look at a common straw man argument which represents Libertarian Freedom in a way that makes it sound obviously false. This mischaracterization seems to say that to affirm Libertarian freedom is to affirm that man's ability to choose is free from any external pressures or influences. But this is not what Libertarian freedom entails. Libertarian freedom entails freedom from an external cause. Pressures or influences are not causes.

Consider a chain of dominos. The first domino falls, which causes the second domino to fall, which causes the third domino to fall, etc. But the dominoes that fall are not victims of mere "influences" or "pressures." They are victims of causes. That the dominoes fall is a direct, mechanistic result of something pushing the first domino over. The dominoes themselves don't know what's happening to them,  they have no choice in the matter. They aren't really "acting" at all, though they do move… at least for a moment. But their movements are entirely determined by the laws of physics. The dominoes lack agency.

But why did the first domino fall? The first domino fell because someone with agency decided to knock it down. And so we see the stark contrast between agency and the absence of agency.

This, ultimately, is the question we're wrestling with when it comes to human freedom: Are we dominoes, or are we agents?

And if we're just dominoes, then who is responsible for our actions? Can dominoes be held responsible for their actions? Or would we say that the agent must be responsible?


Here's a question: Let's suppose the agent's name is Fred, and let's suppose he knocked over the first domino. Did he do so free from any external influence or pressure?

We could say that the Fred's decision wasn't caused by any external entity, but we can't really say that Fred's actions weren't influenced by some external entity. Maybe, for example, a second agent (Bob) offered Fred $10 to start the domino chain. This could only be described as a "cause" if Fred lacked the ability to reject Bob's offer. But maybe $10 isn't enough. Is Fred free to say "I'm sorry, I won't knock the dominoes over for only $10." If Fred could reject Bob's offer, then the offer is merely an influence. Influences can be resisted.

So, back to the straw man: Is the person who affirms Libertarian freedom saying that our decisions are free from influences and pressures? Of course not!

Most of our decision-making is goal-oriented. That is, we have the consequences in mind when we make decisions. I might decide to turn right at the intersection because going straight would place me on a longer route. A longer route has consequences: More fuel is used and therefore it costs more money. The longer route also takes more time. So to avoid those negative consequences, I choose to turn right. And that choice also has consequences. Since it's a shorter route, it'll use less fuel and won't cost as much and won't take as much time. Those are the positive consequences. But the right turn might have negative consequences, too. Maybe the longer route is more scenic, while the shorter route sends you though an industrial area. Either way we go, there are consequences… both positive and negative. Those consequences certainly do apply pressure within our decision-making process, and so it can be said that those consequences influence our decisions. But those consequences cannot be said to cause our decisions and here's why: There are positive influences and there are negative influences. If influences are causes, then I'd have to choose both. But we know that's impossible.


Libertarian freedom is also called "indeterminism"; the opposite of determinism. It's the idea that my decisions or actions (a decision is an action) are not determined for me by any external entity. In other words, I'm the agent, not the domino.

If Divine Determinism is true, then I'm the domino and God is the agent. And if I am the domino, then I have no agency and I have no responsibility. If I'm not the domino, then I have to be an agent and I have responsibility. There is no third option.

I hope by now it's evident that influences are not causes and that Libertarian freedom isn't about making choices apart from influences. It's only about making decisions apart from external causes. It's only about having agency as opposed to being a domino.

To reinforce this, I'll recycle a quote I used in the post called "Human Freedom: Denying The Upper Story."

In the quote, J Warner Wallace--a Calvinist apologist who rejects Libertarian freedom--seems to appeal to Libertarian freedom (and reject determinism) as he defended the personhood of infants:

    "So what makes us 'morally relevant'? It seems that morality is based on the ability to say that we have free agency, that we could have chosen otherwise. If we can't choose otherwise, and we're just another domino falling because some synapse fired in our brain that was caused by something we ate or something that was already pre-designed in our genes, we can't step out of our nature and make a decision that's above our nature, then you really can't hold us morally accountable for anything. Fault requires the freedom to choose something that you should or shouldn't choose."

and…

    "…Morality is based on the ability to say that we have free agency, that we could have chosen otherwise. If we can't choose otherwise, and …we can't step out of our nature and make a decision that's above our nature, then you really can't hold us morally accountable for anything. Fault requires the freedom to choose something that you should or shouldn't choose."

These are very simple principles. Holding someone responsible for something requires that they have agency. If they don't have agency and they're really just a domino falling, then they cannot be held responsible.